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Interpretations of Public
Expenditure Trends
in East and West
Frederic Pryor

I. INTRODUCTION
For the last twenty-five years Lloyd Reynolds has displayed a
keen interest in analyzing the economic behavior of the government
sector from a comparative point of view.
This is reflected not only
in some of his articles (e.g., Reynolds 1971) but also in his aid to
younger economists at Yale who were working on such problems.
In
particular, Lloyd Reynolds greatly encouraged and assisted basic
research on differences in the public sectors in East and West which I
carried out at the Yale Growth Center.
This essay represents an
attempt to reanalyze some of this early work, taking into account
fourteen years
of
further developments
of
the
nations
under
examination.
The concept of "public sector" refers to three major phenomena:
public ownership of the means of production, public participation
(directly or indirectly) in production decisions, and public financing
of goods, services, and transfer payments through taxes and loans.
And "public" itself can refer to various levels of government, to
"social" authorities, or other groups such as nonprofit units or
charitable foundations.
Although a study of the changing role of the public sector in
countries with different economic systems can thus refer to a wide
range of economic events, a researcher faces two major limitations.
First, certain topics cannot be easily studied because of the paucity
of readily available and comparable data; for instance, it would be
extremely difficult to study differences in governmental participation
in production decision making in many countries.
Second, certain
topics do not seem fruitful to study; for instance, the economies of
Eastern Europe are primarily nationalized, with the exception of^^the
agricultural and petty trade and service sectors, so that trends
in
nationalization primarily reflect changes in sectoral composition of
output, rather than any dramatic change in policy.
I have chosen to
focus this
essay on changes in public
consumption expenditures, particularly related to education, health,
and social welfare, in Eastern and Western Europe.
The topic is
extremely important, for the single most dramatic change in the public
sector in the West in the last twenty years has been rapid growth of
public expenditures. For instance, the average share of total public
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consumption expenditures in the GNP of the OECD nations has risen from
28.5 percent in 1955-57 to 34.5 percent in 1967-69 to 41.4 percent in
1975-76, and further increases are anticipated (OECD 1978, 20-21).
Leading this trend has been the rise in "welfare state expenditures,"
that is, expenditures for education, health, and social welfare (which
includes income maintenance and pensions).
The purpose of this essay is to present some quantitative
evidence on public expenditures to allow us to explore a number of
hypotheses about the causes of this dramatic increase in the public
sector, both traditional approaches from the demand side and more
recent ideas focusing on political factors and other "supply side"
considerations.
By contrasting the experience of nations with
different economic systems, we can also attempt to Isolate the
systemic
factors
underlying
public
expenditures.
The
major
conclusions
of
this
exercise
are
three;
demand
factors
seem
considerably more important than supply factors in explaining this
increase in public expenditures; such expenditures appear to have
grown more rapidly as a share of GNP in the market than the centrally
administered economies; and in the future, such public expenditures
may constitute a significantly higher share of total expenditures in
the market than in the centrally administered economies.
Before turning to the analysis, it must be emphasized that
comparative examination of public expenditures data raises some
important
statistical
problems
which can
only
be
handled
by
circumventing them.
One serious difficulty concerns the meaning of
public investments,
for the government can participate in the
investment process in a variety of ways which may have the same end
result but which utilize different Institutional mechanisms.
In the
United States in 1975, for instance, direct investments by all levels
of government amounted to roughly
24 percent of total
gross
investment.' However, governmental agencies on the federal level also
lent out funds amounting to about 26 percent of total gross investment
and guaranteed a group of loans that amounted to 13 percent of total
gross investment.
Since the degree to which these loans were used for
investment purposes is quite unclear, all we can say is that
government involvement in capital formation was somewhere between 24
percent and 64 percent of total gross investment.
Inclusion of loans
and guarantees by state and local governments would raise the upper
limit and our uncertainty becomes greater. This problem is avoided by
focusing only on current expenditures.
Another difficulty concerns government participation in such
fields as housing, where government action having the same end effect
can take place through direct investment in housing, subsidies for
interest or construction costs or maintenance costs, or various types
of income or rent subsidies to renters.
This problem is avoided by
omitting consideration of housing.
Still another difficulty concerns transfer payments, which can be
either in money or in kind; the latter are extremely difficult to
separate from government expenditures on goods and services (e.g.,
education).
It might also be argued that transfer payments must also
include those given by quasi-public bodies such as pension funds, an
issue that leads us to considerations of "pension fund socialism"
discussed by economists such as Drucker (1976) and which gives rise to
enormous problems in finding comparable data.
These problems are
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avoided by combining current expenditures and transfer payments and by
focusing only upon direct agencies of government at various levels.
For these and other reasons, I have chosen to focus on public
consumption expenditures (i.e., current expenditures for goods and
services plus transfers) in seven specified areas which are made by
various levels of government.
Of course, delineation of "current
expenditures" raises a number of conceptual problems which cannot be
touched upon here.
A number of
specific statistical problems
concerning the expenditures and the GNP data are discussed in the
following section,
a
necessary but unpleasant prelude
to the
presentation of the data and their interpretation.
II. THE DATA
A. Sample Selection
This essay represents an extension of a previous study by the
author (Pryor 1968) that analyzed public consumption expenditures in
seven market,
and seven centrally administered economies.
The
countries originally selected were matched roughly for per capita GNP
in 1956.
Although such levels have diverged considerably, they are
sufficiently close so that the sample can still be used.
Other
problems arise because in one case (Hungary) a centrally administered
economy has tried since 1969 to introduce a guided market economy;
nevertheless, this nation has had central administration of sufficient
magnitude,
and
a
price
structure
sufficiently
distorted
by
differential subsidies and taxes requiring the employment of many
nonmarket allocative devices, so that it must be considered as
representing some type of hybrid economic system leaning toward a
centrally administered system. Furthermore, in a number of the market
economies in the sample, governmental dirigisme of production has
increased,
so
they
have
moved
somewhat
closer
to
central
administration of production; nevertheless, their economic systems
have sufficient market elements so that they may be considered as
representing some type of hybrid economic system leaning toward a
market economy.
In short, the two groups of economies still diverge
to such a degree that we need not abandon the sample and select other
nations.
The
countries
under
consideration and
certain basic
information about them are presented in Table 1.
B. Estimation Procedures
Public consumption expenditures, on which this analysis focuses,
are current governmental expenditures plus transfers that are financed
either by taxes or by governmental borrowing.
Expenditures for
military equipment are considered as a current expenditure.
Although
primary attention is placed on governmental budgetary expenditures,
important
extrabudgetary
expenditures
financed
through
taxlike
payments are also included.
Given problems of obtaining comparable data for the fourteen
countries, this analysis has focused on seven functions financed
through public consumption expenditures for which estimates could be
made.
These
adjusted
budgetary
expenditures
include:
general
administration,
internal security (police and justice), external

TABLE 1
The Sample of Nations In 1970
Centrally Administered Economies

Market Economies

Population
In
thousands

ABE/HNP
In
percent

63.9

17,060

32

Czechoslovakia

62.0

14,330

26

33

U.S.S.R.

46.9

242,760

27

53,660

28

Hungary

42.7

10,340

18

45.1

2,950

24

Bulgaria

37.3

8,490

20

Greece

38.5

8,790

24

Poland

35.4

32,530

23

Yugoslavia

25.8

20,370

28

Romania

31.2

20,250

17

GNP per
capita
Indices

Population
In
thousands

ABE/GNP
In
percent

100.0

204,880

27

East Germany

West Germany

78.2

60,710

28

Austria

54.2

7,430

Italy

49.2

Ireland

U.S.A.

Note;

GNP per
'capita
Indices

ABE/GDP = adjusted budgetary expenditures / gross domestic product.

Sources:

GNP per capita data from Pryor (1979) and Kravis, Heston and Summers (1978).
Population data from United Nations (1977).
Sources and calculation of the ABE/GDP data are described In the text
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security (military, diplomacy, and foreign aid), education, health,
social welfare (pensions plus general social expenditures), and
research and development.
The exact definitions are described in the
book cited above (Pryor 1968).
Adjusting the data from the various nations so that they are
comparable is a wearisome task.
It took me roughly two years of full
time research to make the data for the various nations compatible for
I did not have the
the 1950-62 period that is covered in the book.
luxury of such time to extend these data to 1976; therefore, I was
forced to use a number of shortcut methods that reduced the period of
research but, at the same time, reduced the accuracy of the estimates.
However, by focusing upon welfare state expenditures -- expenditures
on education, health, and social welfare -- I have selected that
subset of expenditure estimates on which I place the most confidence.
The data came from a wide variety of national and international
sources of data (which may be obtained from the author), and they
certainly reflect the most important trends, even if certain details
may be questioned.
In making the estimates, some corrections were
made to the data for 1962 to reflect more recent information; no
corrections were made to 1956 data.* The result of these efforts is
that for this study we have twenty-year series (from 1956 through
1976) of adjusted budgetary expenditures for fourteen nations in
Eastern and Western Europe and North America.
The very difficult task of separating transfers from current
expenditures could not be carried out; therefore we have no valid
method of calculating fixed-price series.
Since we are left with
current-price series, some method must be devised to abstract from the
Impact of gross changes in prices.
The most usual procedure found in
the literature is to express these data in terms of a percentage of
GDP.
However, such a procedure raises a serious problem for the
countries under consideration which deserves brief discussion, for
some interpretive difficulties are involved.
For the market economies, it seemed appropriate to compute the
ratio of public consumption expenditures to the GDP at factor costs,
that is, the GDP at market costs minus net indirect business taxes
(indirect business
taxes
minus
subsidies).
For
the centrally
administered economies, GNP data according to Western definitions are
available for all countries; and GNP minus net indirect business taxes
can be calculated.
Since the difference between GDP and GNP for these
nations is minimal, this is not a problem.
However, the meaning of
GNP at factor prices raises some questions, for there is no market for
capital or land and the factor costs attributable to them in the GNP
at
factor
prices
do
not
necessarily
reflect
their
marginal
productivity as they roughly do in market economies.
Ideally, we should estimate the marginal productivity of these
two factors of production, then revalue all goods and services
according to their factor costs and costs of inputs at these new
prices,
and finally calculate the ratio of public consumption
expenditures to the GNP using these adjusted prices. This task would,
for the seven countries involved, take many years, and we must adopt
some shortcut techniques.
But it should be noted that whatever
technique is involved, the results are strongly affected.
In Table 2
I present ratios of adjusted budgetary expenditures and also of
welfare state expenditures
(l.e., education, health,
and social
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welfare) to the GNP in prices at which the goods and services are sold
or transferred (established prices), GNP minus net indirect business
taxes, and GNP minus net indirect business taxes and also minus profit
taxes.
The results show quite clearly that the value of the ratio
depends critically on which concept of GNP is chosen.
For the centrally administered economies for the rest of this
study I have chosen as the denominator of the expenditures/production
ratio the GNP minus . net indirect business taxes (the same solution
adopted in my previous study).
This should not greatly affect the
trend data; however, those dubious of this procedure should be careful
in comparing relative levels of public consumption expenditures among
nations.
C. The Results
The results of these calculations are presented in Tables 3 and
4.
Between 1956 and 1976, adjusted budgetary expenditures increased
dramatically in all market economies; in contrast, in the centrally
administered economies, these increases were relatively small or, in
the cases of the Soviet Union and Romania, decreases were registered.
(In the former country, so many difficulties were encountered in
estimating external
security
expenditures
that this may
be a
statistical artifact.) Turning to welfare state expenditures, we see
that they account for most of the dramatic increases in the market
economies and, in addition, show an increase (sometimes considerable)
in all centrally administered economies except Romania.
From Table 4 we see that in most countries a major share of the
increase in welfare state expenditures came from increases in social
welfare expenditures.
It should be noted that a major share of these
social welfare expenditures -- about 75 percent or more -- go for
pensions and other payments to the elderly.
The tables contain some
interesting information about the
differential timing of
these changes.
For
instance,
in most
countries, the major changes in welfare state expenditures came after
1962; and in many centrally administered economies, these payments
rose especially after 1970.
It is upon these data that
the
statistical experiments described below are performed to reveal other
facets of this rising importance of the public sector.
III. INTERPRETATIONS
In early studies of the determinants of public expenditures,
primary attention was paid to the demand forces underlying the level
and change of these expenditures.
Somewhat later,
supply side
considerations began to be considered.
Recently we are beginning to
see attempts to apply both demand and supply models.
The data
presented in the previous section are considered in the light of all
three approaches.
A. Demand Approaches
Some statistical considerations.
For at least a half a century
simple
demand
approaches
toward
the
determinants
of
public
expenditures have been used.
A typical equation using just such an
approach is;

Adjusted Budgetary Expenditures/GNP
Valuation Ifethod:
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TABLE 2
The Impact of Various ffethods of Valuation of the GNP on the Expenditures/GNP Ratio in
(Percent)

1970

Welfare State Expenditures/GNP

A

B

C

A

B

C

East Germany

38

32

30

23

20

18

Czechoslovakia

34

26

24

24

19

18

U.S.S.R.

32

27

23

17

14

12

Hungary

22

18

16

13

11

10

Bulgaria

24

20

18

16

14

12

Poland

27

23

19

17

15

12

Romania

19

17

15

13

12

10

Notes: Method A = GNP in established prices (prices at which goods and services are sold or trans
ferred) minus net indirect business taxes (indirect business taxes minus subsidies) minus
business profits taxes.
Ifethod B = GNP in established prices minus net indirect business taxes.
Method C = GNP in established prices.
Sources:

These calculations were made from the public consumption expenditures data described in
the text and from GNP data presented in Thad P. Alton, et al. (1973). The Alton esti
mates were supplemented with data from national sources and, for the USSR, from other
Western recalculations of the Soviet GNP.

TABLE 3
Trends in Public Consumption Expenditures and Welfare State Expenditures, 1956-1976
(Percent of Gross Production)
Adjusted Budget Expenditures

Welfare State Expenditures

1956

1962

1970

1976

1956,

1962

1970

1976

20
25
25
24
21
17
27

23
29
28
25
18
18
28

26
28
31
28
24
24
28

27
38
35
33
34
24
30

8
18
21
15
16
8
13

11
19
23
17
14
10
16

14
20
26
21
18
14
18

19
29
30
16
26
13
19

30
27
30
19
21
20
18

32
26
27
18
20
23
17

36
33
28
28
25
21
13

19
20
14
11
14
12
10

20
18
14
12
12
12
12

20
19
14
11
14
15
12

22
24
16
20
17
14
9

Market economies

U.S.A.
West Germany
Austria
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Yugoslavia

Centrally administered economies

East Germany
Czechoslovakia
U.S.S.R.
Hungary
Bulgaria
Poland
Romania

Sources:

The calculation of this table is described in the text.
The 1956 data are from Pryor (1968).

For Hungary, data are for 1955

369

Notes:

33
31
30
23
28
21
20
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TABLE 4
Education, Health, and Welfare Data
(Percent)

Expenditures as a Percent of Gross
Production
Health

Education

Welfare

Population
65 and over
as Percent of
Population
15 through 64

1956

1976

1956

1976

1956

1976

1956

1976

2.4
2.2
2.5
2.7
2.6
1.3
2.1

5.0
3.8
4.6
5.0
5.8
2.0
4.8

0.9
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.8
1.0
3.2

2.9
5.1
4.6
6.1
7.4
1.4
4.5

4.8
13.1
15.5
9.8
10.0
5.3
7.5

11.3
20.6
21.1
14.8
13.3
9.3
10.0

14.5
14.8
17.1
13.2
18.3
11.5
9.6

16.4
22.9
24.4
17.6
18.8
19.5
13.3

5.1
3.8
2.6
5.3
3.1
3.3
1.9

10.7
11.9
6.4
5.6
5.5
6.5
3.8

11.7
16.3
9.3
11.6
10.3
7.1
5.0

19.7
12.7
8.9
12.7
10.9
8.7
9.6

26.0
18.8
12.4
19.3
16.2
14.7
15.1

Market economies

U.S.A.
West Germany
Austria
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Yugoslavia

Centrally Administered Economies

East Germany
Czechoslovakia
U.S.S.R.
Hungary
Bulgaria
Poland
Romania

3.8
3.8
4.4
2.7
5.1
2.6
3.4

4.9
3.9
3.7
3.4
3.9
3.2
2.5

4.4
4.2
3.0
2.6
3.4
2.6
2.7

Notes; The calculation of the expenditure ratios for 1976 Is described
in the text. For Hungary, data are for 1955 instead of 1956.
Population data for West Germany in 1956 omit West Berlin.
Population data for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia
are for 1975 instead of 1976.
Population data for the USSR
are for 1974 instead of 1976; the age distribution for the
USSR was, in part, estimated.
Sources: The 1956 expenditures data are from Pryor (1968). Population
data for all market economies except Yugoslavia are from
OECD (periodic); data for all other countries are from
United Nations (I960 and 1977).
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= a + bX^
where G is government expenditures as a percentage of GNP, X is a
vector of causal variables
related
to the demand for public
expenditures, b is a vector of coefficients, a is a constant terra, and
t is the time subscript.
One causal variable receiving a great deal
of early attention is per capita income,
an hypothesis called
"Wagner's Law" (Timm 1961), but discussed much earlier by other
economists such as Adam Smith and J. S. Mill. A large number of other
economic causal variables that are somehow related to the demand for
these services have also been proposed, for example, the degree of
urbanization, the density of the area, the size of the governmental
unit, and various demographic variables.
More recently,
social
scientists from other disciplines have attempted to add political
variables (reviewed in Pryor 1968) or sociological variables (Wilensky
1975); the latter seem more promising than the former. Sometimes the
demand for public expenditures is related to certain variables in
isolation from what is happening in the rest of the economy; sometimes
the demand for public expenditures is tied to the demand for private
expenditures and the degree to which the private sector is able to
provide services either as complements to, or a substitute for,
services provided through the public sector.
In recent years this type of specificiation has been considerably
Some analysts have assumed that the basic causal variables
modified.
Influence desired, not actual, government expenditures and that there
is lagged response of actual to desired expenditures (so that an
additional explanatory variable representing government expenditures
in the previous period is added to the above equation).
Other
complications in the form of various types of interactions can be
introduced.
For instance, we can model a mutual causation between
certain response coefficients (b in the equation) and governmental
expenditures or we can make some of the response coefficients
functions of still other independent variables (e.g., when the growth
rate of the economy influences the response to per capita income), so
that some interaction terms must be added to the above equation.
Unfortunately, the sample used for analysis in this study is too small
to permit these various modifications of the simple demand equation to
be introduced successfully.
Two very serious interpretative problems of the regression
analysis based on the demand approach must also be mentioned: these
relate to problems of multicollinearity and confusion between crosssectional and time-series results.
In many of the studies using the demand approach there is
considerable multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. One
example occurs because per capita income and the relative price of
government expenditures, both important demand elements, rise together
and in a number of studies both are included as independent variables.
The interpretations given to the resulting regression coefficients
(and their standard errors) are open to considerable doubt since the
results are so highly sensitive to those cases where one of the two
variables does not predict well the other variable.
In such a case,
if the price variable is dropped, the calculated response coefficient
of government expenditures to per capita income includes price effects
as well.
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In recent years perhaps the most serious interpretative problem
in applying the demand approach has been a confusion of crosssectional and time-series elasticities of government expenditures.
For instance, both T. E. Borcherding (1977, ch. 3) and Sam Peltzman
(1980) have argued that since the income elasticity of public
expenditures
is unity
or
less,
the
dramatic
rise
in
public
expenditures can not be due to demand factors.
However, these demand
elasticities are drawn from cross-sectional regressions of U.S. states
and local governments, and then they are applied to time-series data
where they do not apply.
Several examples can demonstrate this point
more concretely.
Among the OECD nations in recent years, the fastest growing part
of public expenditures is, in most cases, transfer payments and these
are primarily payments to the elderly which are included under my
definition of social welfare expenditures.
As one can see from the
data in Table 4, for the sample nations, at any given point in time
there seems to be only a weak relationship between per capita income
of a country and the relative importance of retired people; but over
time as per capita income has increased, the share of the elderly has
increased dramatically.
Further, as I discuss below, social welfare
expenditures as a share of GNP are related to how long the social
Insurance system has been in operation, which is not strongly related
to per capita income.
So we have very important reasons to expect
that the elasticity derived from time-series data for social welfare
expenditures should be much greater than the elasticity derived from
cross-sectional data.
Another example concerns education expenditures.
At any single
point in time, a certain level of education in the population is
needed to utilize the most modern technology. Comparing two points in
time for a nation with a constant per capita income, the same nation
at the later time will require more educated people because the
general level of world technology rises. Thus for education the timeseries income elasticity should be higher than the cross-sectional
income elasticity.
A final example refers to the situation where the cross-sectional
elasticities are derived from governmental subunits within a nation,
and the time
series
elasticities
refer to
total
governmental
expenditures.
This is an incorrect procedure since we are comparing
two different series of governmental expenditures (the time series
includes federal governmental expenditures while the cross section
does not).
Further, on a state and local level there is a strong
demonstration effect, for example, the state of Mississippi, which is
relatively poor, may have governmental education expenditures per
student that are almost the same as those in a much richer state such
as New York, since the students from the former state must later
compete against students from the latter state in the national labor
market.
Since state and local governments make certain decisions
about their expenditures on the basis of what other states are
spending,
the
cross-sectional
income
elasticities
of
public
expenditures may be quite low vis-a-vis the time-series income
elasticities where the causal role of income is more direct.
In the calculations about to be presented, I calculate crosssectional regressions at several different points in time.
I also
calculate cross-sectional regressions of twenty-year changes in each
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country since I do not have enough time slices to calculate true time"
series elasticities for the individual sample nations.
One caveat
must be added: the very peculiar behavior of government expenditures
in Romania provides an extreme point which has some influence on the
results because the sample is small; to determine this effect, I have
calculated the regression results both with and without this nation.
Because the major conclusions are not changed, only the former results
are presented.
Some demand experiments: cross sections of levels.
The
most
aggregative public expenditures data are the most difficult to
explain; for I find no very impressive statistical relationships
between total adjusted budgetary expenditures as a share of GDP and
such explanatory variables as per capita income and an economic
systems dummy variable
in any
of the
four years.
Similarly
unsuccessful results occur when total welfare state expenditures as a
share of GNP is used as the dependent variable instead.
The situation is
quite different
in the case of welfare
expenditures, where the problem is not finding explanatory variables,
but rather separating the effects of the three most promising.
One
variable is per capita income in a common currency;’ and one would
suspect that the higher such income, the higher the share of welfare
expenditures since the greater amount of discretionary income the
society would have for such purposes.
A second variable is the ratio
of the population aged sixty-five and over to the population fifteen
through sixty-four; and one would suspect that the higher this ratio,
the greater the share of welfare expenditures in the economy since
pensions constitute the greatest portion of these expenditures and the
need for such pensions would be greatest.
A third variable is a
supply variable, namely, the length of time that the social insurance
system had been in operation. (The operation of this variable is
discussed below.)
In addition
to these
three
intercorrelated
variables, I also include an economic systems variable which plays
several roles: as a measure of market versus centrally administered
economy; as a measure of multiparty versus single party rulership (for
the market economies, however, Yugoslavia is similar to Eastern
Europe); and as an additional measure of need, since the retirement
age is lower in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. The effect of
this need can be argued in several ways.
Although the lower
retirement age in Eastern Europe would indicate a higher ratio, the
greater inequalities of income in the market economies (on which data
are presented in Pryor 1973, ch. 3) would indicate a greater relative
need for welfare payments to those in the lower part of the income
distribution.
In short, we have counteracting forces that may cancel
each other out.
Therefore, we are left with the economic system and
the multiparty versus the single-party political systems.
Evaluation
of the impact of these phenomena on welfare expenditures raises a
number of ideological and other issues for which no definitive answer
can be given.
Therefore,
I
include the variable as possibly
important, but without prediction about its sign.
Since the results
for all four time slices are roughly similar, in Table 5 I present
such regressions only for 1956 and 1976.

V

TABLE 5
Cross-Country Experiments with Welfare Expenditures
A. Variables:
AGED “ ratio of population 65 and over to population 15 to 65.
YCAP - logarithm of per capita GNP In a common currency.
YEARS ■> years from founding of social Insurance system to 1970.
SYS “ 0 for market economy; 1 for centrally administered economy.
WFARE > logarithm of ratio of welfare expenditures to GDP.
B. Correlation Matrices;
AGED
1956
AGED 1956
YCAP 1956
YEARS
SYS
WFARE 1956

AGED 1976
YCAP 1976
YEARS
SYS
WFARE 1976

YCAP
1956

YEARS

SYS

WFARE
1956

1.00

.53
1.00

.52
.27
1.00

-.33
-.17
.03
1.00

.61
.35
.72
-.32
1.00

AGED
1976

YCAP
1976

YEARS

1.00

.53
1.00

.65
.34
1.00

SYS

-.18
-.18
.03
1.00

WFARE
1976
.65
.54
.47
-.47
1.00

Regressions (standard errors In parentheses) ;
1956
WFARE - 1.039 - 0.274 SYS + 0.0209 YEARS
(0.150)
(0.0053)

R^ - .5172
R-^ adj. - .4770

WFARE - 1.192 - 0.104 SYS + 0.0688 AGED
(0.204)
(0.0301)

R^ - .3752
R^ adj. - .3231

WFARE » 1.284 - 0.216 SYS + 0.264 YCAP
(0.225)
(0.235)

R^ - .1255
R^ adj. - .0526

1976
WFARE - 1.930 - 0.364 SYS + 0.0127 YEARS
(0.166)
(0.0058)

R^ - .4582
R-^ adj. - .3597

WFARE - 1.538 - 0.274 SYS + 0.0567 AffiD
(0.154)
(0.0200)

R^ - .4215
R^ adj. - .3733

WFARE - 0.264 - 0.292 SYS + 0.571 YCAP
(0.173)
(0.282)

R^ - .4343
R^ adj. » .3414

Sources: See Tables 1, 3, 4 and footnote 3. Data on social Insurance
systems: U.S. Dept, of Health, Educ., and Welfare (1975).
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For the two years presented in the table the results are somewhat
different.
In 1956, the number of years of operation of the social
insurance system appears unambiguously the single most important
explanatory variable; in 1976, the explanatory role of the percentage
of aged, and also the per capita income, appear practically the same.
In both years the centrally administered economies also appear to have
lower welfare
expenditures;
however,
with one
exception these
coefficients designating the economic system are not statistically
significant at
the
.05
level.
In
1976,
however,
statistical
significance at a somewhat lower level of confidence is achieved and
if the trends persist,
it appears from these calculations that
sometime in the future the share of welfare expenditures in the GNP of
the market economies may be significantly higher than in the centrally
administered economies.
Such conclusions can also be drawn, albeit
more tentatively, if the regressions are calculated with Romania
omitted.
Some demand experiments: cross sections of changes. The
timeseries patterns among countries have varied considerably and it is
useful to attempt to separate the important causal factors underlying
this phenomenon.
A simple way to approach this is by comparing
changes between the two ends of the twenty-year period; therefore, I
have selected as a dependent variable the percentage change of the
ratios of various public consumption expenditures to the GDP.
That
is, if the expenditures/GDP ratio rose from .10 to .15, the dependent
variable is the 50 percent increase in this ratio.
To explain such
changes, a number of possible explanatory variables can be selected.
An obvious candidate to explain the growth of expenditures is the
initial level of the variable: other things being equal, it seems
likely that the growth of any expenditure would be inversely related
to the initial level of this share.
Another candidate for an
explanatory variable is per capita income; other things being equal,
the higher this income variable, the greater the share of GNP growth
can be considered discretionary,
and the faster the growth of
expenditures might be if it were a "luxury." A third candidate for an
explanatory variable is the economic system,
and a variety of
ideological considerations can be imagined for its justification.
A
fourth candidate is the growth rate of GNP,
and two possible
relationships could influence the results.
The faster the growth of
GNP, the more public expenditures might lag behind what .they are
desired to be, since other parts of the economy are growing so
quickly; thus there might be an inverse relation between GNP growth
and the growth of public expenditures.
Further, the slower public
expenditures grow, the more resources are available to increase growth
in other parts of the economy so that an inverse relationship between
GNP and public expenditures growth from this reversed causality is
also possible. Unfortunately, the sample is too small for separating
these effects or dealing in the most satisfactory manner with any
possible simultaneous equations bias.
Some of the results with the highest degree of explanatory power
are presented in Table 6.
The regressions results when Romania is
dropped from the sample are quite similar and are not included.
It is
interesting that we are able to explain time-series of the most
aggregative
public
expenditures
more
easily
than
the
more

< s
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TABLE 6
Experiments with Expenditure Share Changes

A. Variables:
PTOT ■» percentage change In share of total adjusted budget expen
ditures In GDP between 1956 and 1976.
PHEW = percentage change of share of health, education, and wel
fare expenditures In GDP between 1956 and 1976.
PWEL - percentage change of share of welfare expenditures In GDP
between 1956 and 1976.
SYS “ 0 for market economy; 1 for centrally administered economy.
GDPGR > average annual GDP growth between 1956 and 1976.
YCAP “ per capita GNP In common currency.
HEW56 ~ share of health, education, and welfare expenditures In
GDP In 1956.
WEL56 = share of welfare expenditures In GDP In 1956.

B. Regressions (standard errors In parentheses):

PTOT - 0.864 - 0.399 SYS - 0.0976 GDPGR
(0.063)
(0.0263)

- .8414
R^ adj. - .8126

PHEW - 2.164 - 0.324 SYS - 0.184 GDPGR - 4.852 HEW56
(0.129)
(0.057)
(1.669)
R^ - .6939
R^ adj. - .6021

PWEL - 0.821 - 0.188 SYS - 0.0606 WEL56 + 0.0106 YCAP56
(0.167)
(0.0242)
(0.0051)
R^ - .5091
R^ adj. - .3698

Sources: Data from sources cited In Tables 1, 3, 4 and footnote 3
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disaggregated series, which is exactly the reverse of the experiments
reported in Table 5.
Further, for welfare state expenditures as a
whole, as well as for social welfare expenditures separately, the
expected negative relationship between initial level and subsequent
growth appeared.
This, in turn, suggests that these levels of public
expenditures are converging, at least between nations with the same
economic system.
An extremely puzzling result occurs in the regression experiments
for the growth of welfare expenditures, namely, that neither the share
of aged in the population in the initial year, nor the percentage
growth of the share of the aged, nor the growth rate in the GNP,
seemed to influence the results in any important manner.
This is
exactly contrary to the cross section results of absolute levels where
the percentage of aged played an apparently important causal role.
I
suspect that the discrepancies between the two sets of results
occurred because the role of this variable, as shown in Table 5, was
somewhat different in the two time slices.
Unfortunately, we have
insufficient data to explore this matter more deeply and, indeed, it
may be a simple statistical artifact.
B. Supply Approaches
Supply approaches toward the explanation of determinants of
public expenditures depend crucially on mechanisms either directly
related to the process of producing government services
(e.g.,
economies of scale) or bureaucratic processes within the government
itself.
It is useful to review rapidly some of these variables which
have
received
recent
attention
in
order
to
determine
their
applicability to the problem at hand.
Scale and relative productivity effects.
If economies of scale
were important in the production of public services, one would suspect
that the share of public expenditures in the GDP would decline,
ceteris paribus, as the GDP increased. Of course, such a scale effect
lowers the effective price and, as a result, influences demand so that
one must try to take account of a complicated interaction of
variables.
This does not seem to provide an interpretative problem
for
these
data
since
few
econometric
studies
of
government
expenditures have revealed any important scale effect.
The relative productivity effect, on the other hand, does appear
important.
The argument is quite simple: because productivity in the
production of services generally increases more slowly than in the
production of goods, and because wages in the production of government
services keep pace with the wages in other sectors of the economy, the
relative costs of government services will rise, and we would expect a
rise in the share of public expenditures in the GDP when both are
defined in current prices, at least in so far as the price elasticity
of demand for government services is not sufficiently great to cause a
decrease in the quantity of government services demanded that totally
offsets such a rise in relative costs.
A good deal of evidence is available to support this position.
On a macroeconomic level, for instance, the OECD (1978) has shown that
in constant prices, the ratio of production of government services to
the GDP has stayed roughly constant while the current price ratio has
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risen considerably.
The current price ratios have risen because of
this price effect and also because transfers (which were not included
in government services) rose.
Further, a number of studies have
attempted to demonstrate the extremely slow rise in productivity for
particular governmental services, especially on the local level (e.g.,
Bradford, Malt, and Oates 1964).
The role of relative productivity
differences as a cause of the rising level of government expenditures
to the GDP seems to be generally accepted, and to be part of the
conventional wisdom in public finance.
However, the importance of the relative productivity effect has
recently been challanged by Orzechowski (1974) who points out that in
the United States the capital/labor ratio in the federal governmental
sector (even with defense excluded) is much higher than in the
manufacturing sector as a whole.
Therefore, there is no reason to
believe that its productivity growth (at least at this level) should
be lower than the economy as a whole.
Unfortunately, since government
output is so difficult to measure (and, indeed, is measured in the GNP
account in terms of inputs), productivity increases may not be
reflected in the statistics used to compute the expenditures/GDP
ratios.
Since I have measured the government services in terms of their
inputs in the sample nations, the relative productivity effect
certainly may play a role in the rise of the expenditures/GDP ratio.
However, it is not by any means the only cause of all the rise, for,
as shown in Table 4, such expenditures as welfare, which consist
mostly of transfers, have risen very fast as well.
Unfortunately, I
have no way of measuring this relative productivity effect -- and
neither does anyone else examining the problem on a macroeconomic
level.
The displacement effect.
In a well-known book, Alan Peacock and
Jack Wiseman
(1961)
proposed that
the
pattern
of
government
expenditures over time reveals a ratchet effect.
Due to the
difficulties of the political authorities in raising tax rates,
government expenditures as a ratio of GNP move along some slowly
changing trend line until the occurrence of a war or other national
emergency.
At this point, it is politically feasible to raise tax
rates and, after the end of the national emergency,, they may be
lowered, but never to the previous level.
In short, the national
emergency provides a displacement of the trend.
Such an argument is a
particularization of a common hypothesis
among historians
that
economic crises lead to a strengthening of government as groups
attempt to utilize the government to resolve their problems.
This rather superficial theory has received considerable comment
in the literature. Most attempts to test it statistically using timeseries
data
from
various
nations
have generally
revealed the
displacement to be small or negligible in most cases. More important
to our purposes, this theory does not explain the dramatic increase in
public expenditures as a ratio of GNP in the West during the last two
decades, for most countries have not experienced war.
Although to
save the theory we might define this period as a "national emergency,"
such a step changes the theory into a tautology, which was certainly
not the intention of its proponents.
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A government employee voting mechanism.
A number of economists
(especially the authors of the essays in Borcherding 1977) have
suggested that the presence of government workers in a democracy adds
an impetus to the growth of governmental expenditures, for it is in
their career interests to vote for candidates favoring larger budgets.
Since empirical evidence has shown that governmental employees have a
much higher participation in voting than the average voter, these
workers may constitute a swing vote that brings about an upward spiral
of government expenditures.
As economists such as Courant (1979), Greene and Munley (1979),
and Pommerehne and Frey (1978) have pointed out, this approach has
some theoretical difficulties which reduce its credibility.
It would
not be surprising that empirical tests of the hypothesis on local
governmental votes have not been able to validate it.
This approach
also does not seem promising to explain trends in public expenditures
in East and West.
A monopoly mechanism.
Drawing upon the work of William Niskanen
(1971), some economists (e.g., Orzechowski 1977) have pointed toward
the following constellation of factors as underlying the growth of
government
expenditures.
First,
government
bureaucrats
try
to
maximize their budgets, for this allows them to Increase their
personal power over resources.
Second, the output of government is
hard to measure, as is the efficiency of the offices performing this
work. Third, politicians in the legislature have neither the time nor
the expertise to check thoroughly the budgets of these agencies to
determine carefully what they are producing and how productive their
work is.
Thus, the government bureaus stand in a monopoly position
vis-a-vis the politicians and, therefore, government expenditures tend
to increase.
It can be argued that politicians have an incentive to be elected
and since high taxes are painful to pay, they have an incentive to
keep the expenditures of the government at a low level so as to
maximize their votes.
This would invalidate the third argument.
Further, the conclusion does not follow from the assumptions.
That
is, although the government.bureaus may stand as monopolists vis-a-vis
the legislature, this means only that their budgets are somewhat
higher than they ordinarily would be,
and that they may be
inefficient, not that the ratio of these budgetary expenditures to the
GNP is constantly rising.
Another problem with this type of approach is that a static
argument is being extended illegitimately to a dynamic situation.
That is, the argument was originally propounded in terms of a crosssectional comparison.
Even if we assume that it is correct, it does
not imply that the share of public expenditures will increase over
time, something that Niskanen (1975) has pointed out.
A variant of this argument is one of the humorous laws propounded
by G.
Northcote Parkinson, who suggested that it is the essence of
bureaucracy to increase its expenditures, even when the tasks it
performs may be decreasing.
There is, of course,
considerable
anecdotal evidence for this position. And as I have pointed out in a
previous section, the ratio of such expenditures to the GNP depends in
part on how long the social insurance system has been in operation:
the
longer the time period,
the higher the
ratio of public
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expenditures. This is because such programs increase in the share of
the population served, in the extent of their programs, and in the
magnitude of the payments. The crucial question, however, is whether
these changes represented a demand or a supply phenomenon.
The question becomes more pointed when examining the results of a
quantitative study of public expenditures by the OECD for their member
nations for a period from the early 1960s to the early 1970s.
The
results (OECD 1978, 26) showed that for the total growth of social
welfare expenditures, 16 percent was due to demographic changes (e.g.,
a larger number of the elderly receiving social insurance), 44 percent
was due to eligibility changes, 24 percent to increased per capita
payments and changes in the relative size of real benefits, and 16
percent to changes in costs.
Clearly the impact of demographic
factors can not be attributed to supply factors.
Are the changes in
eligibility, per capita payments, and real benefits a result of
bureaucratic forces?
Or did these changes truly reflect the demands
of the voters? Unfortunately, no statistical analysis separating such
factors has yet been made for this case.
Other supply effects.
A number of analysts have pointed toward
other supply effects.
For instance,
in city expenditures, the
presence of a city manager versus a mayoral form of government seems
to make a difference.
Or the presence of grants from a central
government to local governments may increase local governmental
expenditures.
Or the presence of competiton between local governments
for enticing industry to their regions may act to lower expenditures,
at least in so far as low tax rates are offered to potential
investors.
No believable evidence has yet been presented that such
supply effects would make much difference on the national level on
which we are focusing.
Other types of supply effects, for example,
the impact of public spending limits, appear to have more effect
(Pascal 1979) but the evidence on these matters is relatively limited.
The occurrence of some special supply effects for Eastern Europe
must also be noted.
For the Soviet Union, Gur Ofer (1973) has shown
that the analysis of the service sector (including the government
sector) must take into account the presence of less-trained workers
(particularly women) than in other sectors, the underpricing of
defense goods (which is made up to the producers by subsidies that are
not included in these calculations), the underpricing of medical
services (because of the relatively low salaries of doctors), and the
constant campaigns to cut down "unproductive labor." Obviously, some
of these factors are offsetting so that their net effects are much
smaller than their separate gross effects.
Moreover, some appear to
apply more to the Soviet Union than to some of the other Eastern
European nations (e.g., in the DDR, the salaries of doctors are
relatively high).
Two observations about such supply factors special to Eastern
Europe
must be
made.
First,
in
most
cases,
they
introduce
quantitative effects that are strictly of secondary importance.
Second, they probably affect cross-sectional analyses more than timeseries analyses since there is little reason to believe that such
effects are growing or declining in importance.
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C. A Combined Approach
The combined supply and demand approaches that have been proposed
usually focus upon the mechanisms by which the demand for public
expenditures is related to the financing of such expenditures.
Perhaps the earliest exponent of such an approach was Alexis de
Tocqueville (1835) who considered the relative public expenditures in
three communities whose legislatures were dominated, respectively, by
the richest class, by the middle class, and by the most numerous and
poorest class.
De Tocqueville argued that public expenditures would be lowest
when the middle class had legislative power, for this class would be
loath to tax itself:
"Nothing is so onerous as a large impost levied
upon a small income.
The government of the middle classes appears to
me the most economical, I will not say the most enlightened, and
certainly not the most generous, of free governments." When universal
suffrage occurs, the poor are invested with the government of
authority.
And in this case, "[public] expenditures will always be
considerable, either because the taxes cannot weigh upon those who
levy them, or because they are levied in a manner as not to reach
these poorer classes."
This kind of approach has been embodied in analyses of the growth
of public expenditures in several different ways.
Sometimes it is
generalized in a manner that focuses upon the relative strength of the
beneficiaries of public expenditures compared with those who pay the
For instance, Meltzer (1976) argues that
taxes to finance them.
public expenditures rise because the beneficiaries are more organized
and have more to gain by public expenditures benefiting them alone
than any single individual outside the group loses.
Thus, the latter
have less incentive to organize around the issue than the former.
Such an argument has a great deal of Intuitive appeal, but it is
difficult to see exactly how it could be empirically tested.
Peltzman (1980) has recast de Tocqueville's approach in an
elegant model.
(He reaches farther back in history and designates the
poor taking from (taxing) the rich as the "Robin Hood effect.") He
mathematically derives three propositions
for a democracy with
universal sufferage.
1. The wider the range of income between the
rich and the poor, the higher the taxes on the rich and public
expenditures will be.
2. The narrower the range of income among the
lower-income classes, the higher the taxes on the rich and. thus the
public expenditures will be.
3. The more educated the lower-income
classes, and the more able they are to understand and operate the
political process, the higher the taxes on the rich and public
expenditures will be.**
But
what does
this
tell us
about
nations whose
public
expenditures are not decided through a legislature whose members are
elected through universal sufferage?
Certainly some nondemocratic
societies (e.g., Japan before the Meiji restoration) had considerable
public expenditures.
However, this arose because the rich controlled
the state and used the state to benefit themselves by taxing the poor.
Other precapitalist societies without universal suffrage appear to
have had a relatively low level of public expenditures.

382

What does such an approach tell us about the differences between
public expenditures in East and West?
Assuming away, for the moment,
differences in the political structure, no firm conclusions can be
drawn.
Certainly the income distribution per se should play no
important role, for in Eastern Europe the income differences within
the lower half of the income distribution, and between the lower and
the upper halves of the income distribution, seem more equal than in
the West (Pryor 1973) and, according to Peltzman, these two effects
work in opposite directions on public expenditures.
Further, the
educational levels are not very different between the two sets of
countries.
Of course, in the nations of Eastern Europe the legislature plays
a very minor role in the setting of the governmental budgets and,
further, competition between political parties for votes does not
occur.
From this, Peltzman's argument suggests that welfare state
expenditures would be greater in the West during the entire period.
However, we only find this phenomenon appearing in the 1970s; before
this, such expenditures were roughly the same.
Further, Peltzman's
approach does not give us any clues as to why public expenditures in
the East started to rise in the 1970s.
Trying to combine the supply and demand approaches toward public
expenditures gives us very few theoretical guideposts to tell us
whether such expenditures will be higher in the East or West.
The
only relevant data presented in this essay that concerns this issue
are the series on welfare, where it seems likely that there is a
redistribution of income between the rich and poor.
Although it
appears from the regression experiments in Tables 5 and 6 that such
welfare expenditures are relatively lower and are increasing less
quickly in Eastern than in Western Europe, the sample is small and we
can not be completely sure on this.
Further, the experiment is not
completely "clean" because the really important redistributional
element in such welfare expenditures is from the middle aged to the
old.
IV. SOME REFLECTIONS
A number of questions have been raised in this essay. To explore
them empirically,
it would be useful to employ , a complicated
multiequation model that can bring in many of the factors discussed.
But the data do not permit us this luxury.
Although firm analytical conclusions can not be drawn, it appears
that demand elements play the most important role in the increase in
public expenditures in both East and West.
With the exception of a
variable indicating length of existence of the social insurance
system, no supply variables appeared important in the regression
analyses.
Even the"relative productivity effect" does not seem very
important, at least in the recent past.
The role of the systems variable is complicated.
It does not
appear significant in the cross-sectional regressions of expenditure
levels except, perhaps, at the most disaggregated level for welfare
expenditures where the centrally administered economies have a lower
share of such expenditures in their GDP.
However, in the crosssectional regressions of changes in expenditures over time, it appears
that for expenditures defined in the most aggregated manner, such
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total public consumption expenditures increased more slowly as a share
of GDP in the centrally administered economies than in the market
economies. However, on a disaggregated level this does not appear to
be the case for certain types of expenditures such as for welfare.
Together, such results suggest that in the future, for all levels of
expenditures, the centrally administered economies will have a lower
share of adjusted budgetary expenditures.
Certain empirical questions are even more difficult to answer.
For Instance, when will the share of public expenditures in the GDP
stop rising, a pressing question that has been discussed both on the
political level in various electoral campaigns throughout the world,
as well as on a theoretical level (see, for example, the views of
economists in a large number of nations in Recktenwald 1978). To help
us answer this question, several conflicting factors need to be taken
into account.
First, for the fastest growing components of adjusted budgetary
expenditures, namely, health, education, and welfare (and for social
welfare alone), the rapidity of growth is inversely proportional to
the share of these expenditures in the initial period (Table 6). This
suggests a slowing down of growth in the future.
Second, although many of the demand influences underlying past
increases of public expenditures show no signs of abating, we can not
be completely sure that these will continue to play an important
causal role in the rise in the share of public expenditures.
For
instance, the aged continue to increase as a share of the population
and, therefore, one part of social insurance expenditures might appear
to continue to rise.
The aged also have greater health needs and,
therefore, another part of social insurance expenditures might rise.
However, the change in the share of the aged did not appear to
influence the change in expenditures directed to them, at least in the
twenty year time period under examination.
Third, the demand forces for other types of public expenditures,
for example, for education, may increase at a very slow rate or cease
entirely.
For education, however, offsetting factors influencing
public expenditures can be cited: the lower birth rates and a falling
share of children in the population make for a decline in the relative
share of education; but the increasing complexity of society requires
increased education expenditures.
For
some expenditures it
is
difficult to say how the major causal elements will change.
For
instance, for defense expenditures, it is clear that the rising
international tensions in the short run will not abate; in the long
run, however, the situation may be different, and nations may become
more civilized to their neighbors so the need for such expenditures
may decrease.
Fourth, many of the existing governmental programs in most
developed countries in the West have considerable room for an
expansion of the eligibility requirements (OECD 1978, 30-38).
The
political ability to resist these increases depends crucially on
changes in the strength of these governments, and these are difficult
to predict.
It should be noted that effective national movements to
bring about the limitation of government taxation or expenditures (as
manifested through such activities as parliamentary action to limit
taxes, tax evasion, and reduced work effort) seem far in the future
for many countries.
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The share of public consumption expenditures in the GDP has been
rising in most nations in East and West and, at least in the near
future, should continue along this path.
Predicting the long-term
future of this share is dangerous since the relative strengths of
various offsetting factors can not be determined.
If pressed, I would
bet that a leveling off will occur in the next decade.
However, I
would not lay much money on such a bet.

FOOTNOTES
For assistance in obtaining data I would like to thank Thad
Alton, Noel Farley, Helen Hughes, Peter Miovic, and the various
national statistical agencies that sent me published and unpublished
data.
I would also like to thank David Muething, Gur Ofer, and Larry
Seidman for their comments on a previous draft of this paper.
1.

The U.S. national accounts data do not include expenditures for
construction and equipment by various levels of government in the
investment data.
These latter expenditures (taken from U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1978, 288) were added to the national
accounts data to obtain total investment. Data on federal
government loans and guarantees comes from Murray L.
Weidenbaum
(1977).

2.

The major corrections for 1962 occurred not in the public
expenditures data, but rather in the GNP data for several Eastern
European nations.
The public expenditures estimations for 1970
and 1977 were too tedious to be reported here.
A desription of
the methods can be obtained from the author.

3.

The per capita GNPs in a common currency for 1970 are reported in
Table 1.
To calculate
such data for other years, the following
sources were used forthe market
economies; OECD 1979;
I.B.R.D.
1975; I.B.R.D.
(forthcoming).
For the centrally administered
economies the following sources were utilized:
Alton 1977; Alton
1970; Bloch 1979; Greenslade 1976.

4.

To demonstrate his theory empirically, Peltzman (1980) used four
sets of data: long-time-series data for the U.S.A., the U.K., and
Japan;
cross-sectional OECD data; data on state and
local
expenditures in the various U.S. states in different years; and
some
cross-sectional
datafor
various
developing
nations.
However, such analyses can be criticized on several grounds.
First,
he
used total
government expenditures,
rather than
expenditures related to redistribution as his theory specified.
Second, since a narrowing of income differences between the
richest and the poorest, and within the poorest, groups appears
highly correlated, and since these differences lead to opposite
changes in public expenditures, they must be separated.
However,
only for the data concerning the U.S. states did this appear
possible. Third, the results for the U.S. states did not validate
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his theory until a cross-product term involving education was
added.
However, there appeared to be multicollinearity between
this term and the other independent variables so that the results
can be questioned. Finally, it is possible that his results were
due to the causal arrows running in the opposite direction.
For
instance, a more progressive tax may lead to less investment in
human and physical capital which will, in turn, reduce the labor
supply for high-incpme occupations.
This will later raise the
wages in these groups which, in turn, will lead to a greater gap
between the rich and poor. Thus a greater differentiation between
rich and poor is associated with a more progressive income tax,
but the tax causes the differentiation.
Another instance would
occur where higher social insurance payouts lead to less labor
being offered by older workers which, in turn, means that their
monetary income is lower (but they work less) and there is a
greater gap between older and poorer workers on one hand, and
richer people on the other.
Thus a greater differentiation of
income between rich and poor is associated with a greater social
security payout, but the latter brought about the former.
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